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Reasons to Avoid the Anchor:  
Negotiation in Patent Prosecution 
Kevin Johnston* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Acquiring a patent on an invention can be a long, confusing, and expensive 
ordeal for inventors and businesses alike.1  To alleviate these difficulties, patent 
attorneys and agents, sometimes called patent prosecutors, are there to guide those 
seeking patent protection over the course of the patent process.  Inventors and patent 
prosecutors must establish an understanding and a good working relationship as a 
foundation to operating in the muddled intersection of science and law.2  Rapport 
with inventors, however, is only one side of the coin for patent prosecutors.  On the 
other side, there is an entirely different, yet equally vital, relationship to be built and 
maintained: ongoing bargaining with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”).  Despite the unique rules and practices surrounding patent law, 
patent prosecution is ultimately a function of negotiation.3 
The features of patent prosecution that liken it to negotiation are readily evident 
upon examination.  Agreement is essential to the registration of a patent, and 
“[a]nytime you deal with someone else, seeking to reach agreement on some matter, 
you are involved in a negotiation.”4  Patent prosecution starts with the process of 
filing a patent application with the USPTO and thereafter interacting with the 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2021.  The author wishes to thank Professor 
Crouch for acting as his faculty advisor and for all the guidance, suggestions, and knowledge he 
provided.  Additional thanks to Professor Emeritus Lande for providing information on the framework 
of negotiation used to establish the topic for this article.  The author is also grateful to all the members 
of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for their amazing help in the editing process. 
 1. See  Ralph  E.  Jocke,  Changes  in  Patent  Laws  Create  Confusion  for Inventors, INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. NEWS, http://www.walkerandjocke.com/Articles/Changes%20in%20Patent%20Laws%20 
Article.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); Gene Quinn & Michael Benson, Understanding U.S. Patent 
Prosecution, IPWATCHDOG (June 30, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/30/understanding-
u-s-patent-prosecution/id=98955/ (“The journey from conceiving of an idea through turning that idea 
into an invention through ultimately receiving a patent for an invention can be daunting.  It is a long 
process, with ups and downs along the way, and one that unfortunately can get expensive.”). 
 2. Audrey Millemann, Patent Myths Corrected—Part One, THE IP LAW BLOG (Apr. 2014), https:/
/www.theiplawblog.com/2018/04/articles/ip-law-blog-lawyers-in-the-news/patent-myths-corrected-par
t-one-3/ (“Patent law is a complicated area of law governed by a confusing set of statutes and regulations 
that are interpreted by the [USPTO] and the federal courts.  Patents themselves are sometimes almost 
unintelligible and, if intelligible, may require many hours of reading to understand.”); Gene Quinn, An 
Inventor’s Guide to Being Taken Seriously by Patent Attorneys, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 28, 2015), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/28/inventors-guide-being-taken-seriously-by-patent-attorneys/id 
=56224/ (“[W]hen representation is most successful there is a good working relationship between the 
attorney and inventor, and that requires a certain comfort level and familiarity.”). 
 3. Adam Stephenson, A View of the Future in Semiconductor Process: Patent Prosecution in Class 
438 Under the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Final Claims and Continuations Rules , 8 
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 272, 272 (2008) (“Patent prosecution, despite its often rigidly 
regulated contours, is a process run by people and operates according to negotiation models rooted in 
the fundamentals of human nature and interaction.”). 
 4. MELISSA L. NELKEN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2007). 
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agency through a patent examiner to obtain a U.S. patent.5  The process typically 
involves a multi–year negotiation as the two sides dispute the scope of the patent’s 
claims and limitations imposed by “prior art” and the invention’s own subject 
matter.6  While many practitioners recognize the process can be described as a 
negotiation, few actually treat it as such.  Therefore, both sides of the table often 
miss opportunities to achieve better results through the use of negotiation strategy.7  
That said, not all negotiation strategies transition well into the field of patent law.  
One particularly risky and detrimental technique patent prosecutors should avoid is 
anchoring an offer—an offer being, in this case, the set list of the patent’s claims. 
Section II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the patent prosecution 
process and the typical relationship between applicant and examiner.  Section III 
then sets forth the fundamentals of negotiation theory and introduces the concept of 
anchoring in negotiation.  Next, Section IV explains how anchoring and patent 
prosecution intersect.  Finally, Section V details three key reasons to avoid anchors 
in patent negotiations: the nature of the applicant–examiner relationship, associated 
risks, and incentive programs.  Collectively, this Comment seeks to demonstrate the 
importance of negotiation theory in the relationship between patent examiners and 
applicants with a focus on how anchoring can negatively impact the process. 
II.  PATENT PROSECUTION: BASICS                                                                       
AND INTERESTS 
Promoting progress in science and the useful arts,8 as well as protecting the 
pioneers of such progress, has been cemented into law since the introduction of the 
Progress Clause of the United States Constitution.9  The Progress Clause gives 
Congress the power to, among other things, “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
 
 5. See JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 59 (5th ed. 2016). 
 6. Prior art is a particular reference or piece of knowledge that must be overcome by an applicant 
when the patent examiner uses it to reject one or more claims of the application.  This includes if the 
same application was already patented or described in a printed publication, in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the filing date of the claimed invention.  See Gene Quinn, What 
is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 2, 2010), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-art
/id=12677/; 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (Jan. 2018) 
(Subject Matter eligibility requires that the applicant claim the invention as one of four statutory 
categories: processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter.  Further, the claimed 
invention must not fall into one of the judicially made exceptions to subject matter eligibility: abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena). 
 7. See Jaron Brunner, Patent Prosecution as Dispute Resolution: A Negotiation between Applicant 
and Examiner, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 7 (2014) (stating “[t]ypically, neither patent applicants, nor their 
legal representatives, have formal training in negotiation skills or theory.  In my time as an examiner, 
and now as a practitioner, I have seen many missed opportunities to use negotiation strategies to reach a 
faster and better result.”). 
 8. While it may appear that “promoting progress in science” refers to the field of patent law, at the 
time of construction, the term “science” actually promulgated the copyright clause; “the useful arts” is 
the basis for patent law.  Historically limited to several mechanical or useful arts by definition, the “useful 
arts” are in contrast to the liberal arts of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and 
the theory of music.  Paul D. Swanson, Back to the ‘Useful Arts’—Supreme Court Reins in the Expansive 
Interpretation of Patent Eligibility, LANE POWELL (May 4, 2015), https://www.lanepowell.com/p
ortalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEnCJCo0!/fil
e.name=/0515_SBM_LegalBriefs.pdf. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. 
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”10  Giving those who invent 
exclusivity to make, use, sell, and import is one feature of the patent system, but the 
patent system also serves the important function of publishing written disclosures 
of inventions for the general public.11  This pseudo bargain between inventors and 
the public involves providing the public with “meaningful disclosure in exchange 
for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”12  
With those goals in mind, the U.S. patent system was developed entirely under 
federal law by Congress, which established the USPTO in 1952 to carry out its 
functions.13 
Traditionally, the process of obtaining a patent begins when an inventor files 
an application with the USPTO.14  Filing the application is the start of what is known 
as patent prosecution, or the process of interacting with the USPTO and review of 
the application.15  This application must contain the following elements: a 
specification,16 a drawing,17 and an oath or declaration.18  The specification is to 
contain a written description of the invention and the manner and process of making 
and using it—whatever “it” may be.19  Further, the specification must conclude with 
claims that point out and distinctly declare the subject matter of the invention.20    
Upon receipt of the application, a USPTO patent examiner reviews the application 
to determine whether it meets formal and substantive requirements and returns a 
response of his or her assessment to the applicant.21  This response is called an office 
action,22 and it is almost always a rejection of one or more claims.23  The applicant 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. LYDIA P. LOREN & JOSEPH S. MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 125 
(5th ed. 2017). 
 12. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen–Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 13. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 14. See id. at § 111. 
 15. MUELLER, supra note 5, at § 11.01 ([patent prosecution] refers to the process “of preparing and 
filing a patent application in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and thereafter interacting 
with the agency to obtain a U.S. patent.”). 
 16. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor 
of carrying out the invention.”). 
 17. See id at § 113 (“The applicant shall furnish a drawing where necessary for the understanding of 
the subject matter sought to be patented.  When the nature of such subject matter admits of illustration 
by a drawing and the applicant has not furnished such a drawing, the Director may require its submission 
within a time period of not less than two months from the sending of a notice thereof.”). 
 18. See id at § 115 (an oath or declaration must contain statements that the application was made or 
authorized by the affiant or declarant who believes himself or herself to be the original inventor in the 
application). 
 19. See id at § 112(a). 
 20. See id at § 112(b). 
 21. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 11, at 127 (an applicant is not entitled to a given patent claim unless 
that claim (a) is adequately supported by the written disclosure to which it is attached, (b) constitutes 
patentable subject matter, (c) is useful, (d) is new, and (e) is non–obvious). 
 22. An office action is written correspondence from the patent examiner that requires a properly 
signed written response from the applicant in order for prosecution of the application to continue.  
Moreover, the reply must be responsive to each objection made by the examiner.  Examples of office 
actions include a restriction requirement, a non–final office action, and a final office action.  Responding 
to Office Actions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-maintaining-
trademark-registration/responding-office-actions (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
 23. Michael Carley et al., What is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent?, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
203, 207 (2015) (“[Between 1996 and 2005,] the USPTO allowed 11.4% of the progenitor applications 
3
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then can, and most often does, file a response to the office action after amending 
the claims and urging the examiner to reconsider the rejection(s).24  Responses 
generally result in the start of what is an extensive exchange between the applicant 
and examiner in which each party goes back and forth, amending and rejecting, 
through what is known as the prosecution history.25 
The prosecution of a patent application is an iterative process that hinges on 
the balance of interests between the two parties in the scope of the patent claims.26  
Because patent law encompasses an extremely wide range of inventible material, 
an examiner is assigned to each application based upon his or her expertise in the 
field relevant to the potential patent.27  This allows each examiner to better 
understand the claims of his or her assigned applications and, consequently, process 
applications more quickly. 
The patent examiner’s main interests are issuing only sufficiently narrow 
claims that avoid infringing on any prior art while simultaneously satisfying subject 
matter eligibility requirements.28  Examiners want to avoid issuing “bad” patents, 
meaning patents that should not have been issued due to a failure to meet one or 
more statutory patentability requirements.29  Bad patents go firmly against the 
policy goals of patent law as whole and directly damage innovation and 
competition.30 
“Bad” patents can hinder innovation by increasing transaction costs for 
competitors and harm the public with increased product costs.  The 
Consumer Technology Association has estimated that $1.5 billion is 
wasted by so–called “patent trolls” every week—a staggering $78 billion 
a year.  Thus, examiners who allow “bad” patents clearly harm innovation 
in real, tangible, and quantifiable ways.31 
Examiners can similarly hurt innovation by rejecting good, valid patent 
applications, meaning ones that do meet statutory patentability requirements.32  A 
great deal of discretion33 is allotted to patent examiners during the review process, 
allowing them to deny claims under the formal and substantive requirements 
discussed above.34 
 
at first action and delivered a non–final rejection decision for 86.4% of the applications, with the 
remaining 2.3% abandoned prior to a first action decision.”). 
 24. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 11, at 127. 
 25. Id. (this extended exchange between the applicant and examiner produces an official documentary 
history of the application’s progress through the PTO known as the “prosecution history”). 
 26. Brunner, supra note 7, at 17. 
 27. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 63. 
 28. Brunner, supra note 7, at 11. 
 29. See Mark A. Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents, 28 REGULATION 10, 12–13 (2005). 
 30. Shine Tu, Bigger and Better Patent Examiner Statistics, 59 IDEA: IP L. REV 309, 314 (2018). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Shine Tu, Three New Metrics for Patent Examiner Activity: Office Actions per Grant Ratio (OGR), 
Office Actions per Disposal Ratio (ODR), and Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER), 100 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 277, 281 (2018). Examiners who prevent “good” patents from issuing can also 
harm innovation by increasing costs for companies that are investing in research and development.  By 
increasing innovation costs, these companies may invest less in bringing groundbreaking technology to 
the public.  If transaction costs associated with the patent system grow too large, these companies may 
turn to trade secrets as an alternative to the patent system.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 277, 287. 
 34. LOREN & MILLER, supra note 11, at 127. 
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Patent examiners have a unique set of competing interests to consider when 
evaluating applications.35  Further, patent examiners have an especially unique 
stake in the applications they grant.36  In order to monitor the process for any 
improprieties, the USPTO evaluates patent examiner performance based on four 
criteria: production, quality, docket management, and stakeholder evaluation.37  
Understanding the patent examiners’ interests and time limitations can help patent 
prosecutors effectively communicate with examiners and speed up the patent 
application.38 
Patent applicants usually aim for the broadest claims possible from the start 
and then try to reduce them as little as possible in hopes of gaining patent protection 
over as much of the subject matter possible.39  Applications can, however, include 
claims that are too broad, so much so that the claims run the risk of being ruled 
invalid in subsequent litigation should a dispute arise.40  Outside of the purely legal 
goal of an applicant, there is often also a substantial monetary investment in a patent 
application that influences whether an applicant tries for wider protection or just 
accepts a narrower scope.41  While the exact need varies depending on the applicant 
and the kind of invention, the expediency of patent prosecution is always 
important.42  The sooner a patent is issued, the sooner protection takes effect, as the 
twenty–year duration begins at the filing stage.43  Thus, a quicker process typically 
means fewer office actions and less money spent.44 
Going into the patent prosecution process, applicants almost always start with 
the upper hand.45  In most cases, applicants understand the monetary investment 
they have already put into the invention, how that investment factors into their 
decision making,46 and the details of the invention itself better than anyone else.47  
Applicants might also possess the best knowledge of the prior art surrounding the 
claimed invention.48  Taking those various elements into account, an applicant will 
typically go back and forth with the examiner as he or she tries to achieve his or her 
best interests by amending claims or, alternatively, asking for reconsideration.  At 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Patent examiners, and the USPTO, have a clear interest in the count system installed by the 
USPTO, in addition to the common interest of creating valid patents.  Brunner, supra note 7, at 16. 
 37. Tu, supra note 30, at 277, 284. 
 38. A Patent Examiner’s Tips on How to Speed Up Your Patent Application, PATSNAP (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.patsnap.com/blog/patent-examiners-tips-speed-patent-application. 
 39. Brunner, supra note 7, at 11. 
 40. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 
AIPLA Q. J. 185, 207–08 (1998). 
 41. A conservative estimate is that patent applicants spent about $7.5 billion pursuing patents in 
2012—dwarfing the approximately $1.4 billion the USPTO spent examining applications the same year.  
Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 77 
(2014). 
 42. See Track One Prioritized Examination Puts Your Innovation in the Fast Lane, INVENTORS EYE 
(Nov. 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/track-one-prior 
itized-examination-puts-your (“Speed is an important leverage factor when bringing products to 
market.”). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2013). 
 44. Christopher R. Hilberg, Robert M. Hirning, & Adam P. Kiedrowski, Accelerated Examination: A 
Second Look: Reconsidering the Benefits of the USPTO’s New Accelerated Examination Program , 
2 LANDSLIDE 54 (2010). 
 45. Yelderman, supra note 41, at 77–79. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
5
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the end of the process, the applicant will either receive an issued patent or a final 
rejection from the examiner, ending the prosecution history either way.49  There are 
additional steps an applicant can take upon a final rejection, but such steps extend 
beyond the examiner–applicant relationship at issue in this Comment.50 
III.  NEGOTIATION FUNDAMENTALS 
In order to fully grasp how negotiation and patent prosecution are intertwined, 
it is necessary to understand the fundamentals of negotiation.  There are two 
primary negotiation methods: “positional–based” and “interest–based” 
negotiation.51  Beyond this most basic division, there are many different strategies 
and biases that can affect individual negotiations.52  For purposes of this Comment, 
the main strategy of focus—one that is often visible in the patent context—is 
anchoring. 
A.  Models of Negotiation Theory 
“Negotiation” has a variety of legal definitions.  Some definitions are broad 
and encompassing, while others are more preclusive and have set conditions that 
narrow the word’s scope.53  For example, one broad definition suggests that 
negotiation occurs in the context of both actual and potential conflict.54  On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, narrower definitions limit negotiation to actual, 
apparent conflict.55  Regardless, most definitions agree that the overall spirit of 
negotiation is rooted in the “process of seeking agreement.”56  Conceptualizing 
negotiation in this way, as opposed to viewing it as a more formalized and elemental 
procedure, is prudent because negotiations vary wildly and do not always stem from 
a formal disagreement.57  No matter how exactly negotiation is defined, there are 
two prevailing models of negotiation theory.58  The first model has been variously 
 
 49. See 37 C.F.R. 1.113 (2004). 
 50. An applicant can appeal a Final Rejection to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board, and if affirmed 
there, they may further appeal to the federal circuit.  See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 11, at 128. 
 51. John Lande, A Framework for Advancing Negotiation Theory: Implications from a Study of How 
Lawyers Reach Agreement in Pretrial Litigation, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 16–17 (2014). 
 52. See PON Staff, 10 Hard–Bargaining Tactics to Watch Out for in a Negotiation, HARVARD LAW 
SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION (July 1, 2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/batna/10-hardball-
tactics-in-negotiation/; PON Staff, The Advantages of Bias at the Negotiation Table, HARVARD LAW 
SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-
negotiations/using-bias-to-your-advantage/. 
 53. Lande, supra note 51. 
 54. DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY & PRACTICE (2d ed. 2007) (“[A] process in 
which two or more participants attempt to reach a joint decision on matters of common concern in 
situations where they are in actual or potential disagreement or conflict.”). 
 55. Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: An Empirical 
Study, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 665, 665–66 (1998) (“[The] process of potentially opportunistic interaction by 
which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action 
than they could do otherwise.”). 
 56. Lande, supra note 51. 
 57. Factors that may be considered as components of negotiation include an exchange of offers that 
are close in time, multiple options to choose from, an explicit quid pro quo, and something greater than 
what is present in normal conversation.   Id. at 16. 
 58. Id. 
6
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called distributive, competitive, adversarial, or positional–based negotiation.59  The 
second model is referred to as integrative, problem–solving, cooperative, or 
interest–based negotiation.60  While these models share some common principles 
and values, they are motivated by separate conceptions of social conflict and how 
to resolve disputes.61 
Positional–based negotiation is a “stylized, linear, and ritualized struggle” that 
typically begins with aggressive opening demands that are eventually adjusted up 
or down towards compromise through a series of concessions.62  From a traditional 
perspective, adversarial or positional bargainers typically take firm positions and 
use bluffs, threats, and demands in an attempt to urge the other party into 
agreement.63  The positional negotiator usually aims for the absolute maximum 
result possible, sometimes treating the other party as an opponent and the 
negotiation itself as a zero–sum game.64  The goal in this method is achieving the 
biggest gain, but such gains often come at a cost to the structure and process of the 
negotiation, as well as the relationship, if any, between parties.65  Therefore, the 
positional method is heavily criticized for its focus on winning rather than resolving 
disputes.66 
The interest–based negotiation (“IBN”) method generally serves to satisfy both 
of the parties’ interests, creating positive results amicably and efficiently.67  The 
basic idea behind IBN is that parties can be more successful in a negotiation by 
working together instead of treating each other as competitors to be beat.68  
Negotiators who employ this method are usually more courteous, sincere, open, 
trusting, and reasonable throughout the negotiation process.69  As opposed to the 
zero–sum game played in positional negotiation, IBN works with the intention of 
creating value by engaging each other in a positive–sum game.70  One of the most 
influential books on IBN, Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving 
In, introduces seven key elements of the method: alternatives, interests, options, 
legitimacy, communication, commitment, and relationships.71  After growing 
dissatisfaction with the established positional negotiation method, IBN spread 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 17. 
 61. See Robert J. Condlin, The Nature of Legal Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 393, 397 (2016). 
 62. Carrie Menkel–Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem 
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 769–70 (1984). 
 63. Id. at 755, 778–80. 
 64. Lande, supra note 51, at 39. 
 65. John S. Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J. 179, 183 (1986) 
(adversarial bargainers choose strategies based on what will yield the biggest gain, no matter the cost, 
and ignore concerns of “fairness, wisdom, durability, and efficiency”). 
 66. See Menkel–Meadow, supra note 62, at 754, 765–94 (criticizing the structure and process of 
positional negotiation); Murray, supra note 67, at 179; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation 
Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 
(2002) (stating the adversarial process is stubborn, headstrong, arrogant, egotistical, irritating, 
argumentative, quarrelsome, hostile, and focused on winning instead of dispute resolution). 
 67. Lande, supra note 51, at 27. 
 68. NELKEN, supra note 4, at 91. 
 69. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 11–12 (7th ed. 2012). 
 70. RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY & STRATEGY 101 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that in a 
cooperative or problem–solving style, negotiators should attempt to maximize joint returns). 
 71. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1983). 
7
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quickly, revolutionizing the field of alternative dispute resolution over the last few 
decades.72  Legal educators and law school courses have advocated for the use of 
IBN as an alternative, perhaps even more effective, procedure.73  While the 
scholastic community has adopted the IBN approach, it is not without criticism.74  
Further, not every situation allows for IBN because of the circumstances or interests 
of the specific parties.75 
As mentioned above, positional and interest–based negotiation models are the 
two most generally accepted theories, but they are not the exclusive options.  As 
John Lande explains, “[t]he prevailing negotiation theory tries to fit lots of square 
pegs into just two round holes—adversarial or cooperative bargaining.  In the real 
world, negotiation comes in many different shapes, not just circles and squares.”76  
Simply put, there is a lot more to negotiation and alternative dispute resolution than 
the labels that attempt to place such diverse processes into one category or another.  
Individual strategies matter a great deal regardless of the overarching negotiation 
method employed.  The five most basic strategies are problem–solving, contending, 
yielding, inaction, and withdrawal, but parties are obviously not limited to just a 
single strategy.77 
Before applying any particular strategy, however, understanding the available 
alternatives is key.78  Understanding the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement 
(“BATNA”) is a skill essential to any negotiator seated at the bargaining table.79  
The BATNA for each party creates the zone of possible agreement (termed the 
“bargaining zone”), and guessing the bounds of the zone requires making calculated 
assumptions about the other party.80  Understanding the bargaining zone is a 
prerequisite to any negotiation strategy.81  Underneath the bargaining zone and 
specific strategies, however, are human tendencies or biases that impact how people 
respond and act during negotiations. 
 
 72. Jim Hilbert, Collaborative Lawyering: A Process for Interest–Based Negotiation, 38 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer 
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1380 (2003) 
(“Although many traditional lawyers intend to act cooperatively and often do so, they can get easily 
diverted.  When lawyers perceive that the opposing side is acting unreasonably, they often reciprocate 
to protect their clients and demonstrate that they will not be bullied.”); Hilbert, supra note 72, at 1089 
(stating that lawyers “sometimes employ only a partial or half–hearted interest–based strategy to their 
detriment.”). 
 75. Condlin, supra note 61, at 393, 399 (“A party might have made several unreciprocated concessions 
and decided that it made no sense to continue.”). 
 76. Lande, supra note 51, at 1–2.  John Lande is the Isidor Loeb Professor Emeritus and former 
director of the University of Missouri’s LLM Program in Dispute Resolution.  See John Lande, MU SCH. 
OF LAW, https://mulaw.missouri.edu/lande/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 77. Problem solving focuses on interests to find alternatives and generate options.  Contending 
involves forcing the will of one party on the other.  Yielding involves a reduction in one’s aspirational 
value.  Inaction is doing as little as possible during negotiation.  Withdrawal is the abandonment of the 
negotiation all together.  Dean G. Pruitt, Strategic Choice in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY & 
PRACTICE 27–46 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991). 
 78. Guhan Subramanian, What is BATNA? How to Find Your Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement, HARVARD LAW SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.pon. 
harvard.edu/daily/batna/translate-your-batna-to-the-current-deal/. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Brunner, supra note 7, 8. 
 81. Subramanian, supra note 78. 
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B.  Negotiation Anchoring 
Negotiation biases can be hard to identify and easily go unnoticed despite the 
hidden control they exert on the process.82  One of the most influential biases often 
at play is anchoring bias.83  Anchoring bias is the tendency to give too much weight 
to the first number or proposal suggested, the “anchor,” and then inadequately 
adjust from that point.84  Naturally, there will be anchoring in any negotiation 
because one party must always begin with some form of proposition.  Anchoring 
bias can greatly affect a negotiation from the beginning by drawing attention to 
positive qualities if the anchor starts too high or, alternatively, flaws if the anchor 
starts too low.85 
An anchor can either be a justifiable, rational opening or an irrational and 
arbitrary value beneficial to the offering party.86  Anchoring strategy, which takes 
advantage of the human tendency to attribute too much weight even to baseless 
initial offers, is “an attempt to launch negotiations from an advantageous statement 
of value, regardless whether the position is rational or arbitrary.”87  Thus, though 
all initial offers are anchors, only irrational, baseless, or irrelevant starting 
propositions constitute “anchoring” within the narrower, strategy–based 
definition.88 
In application, there are many ways aggressive anchoring can backfire, such as 
a loss of credibility, damage to the relationship through an erosion of trust and 
respect, inability to ascertain the opposing party’s least acceptable agreement—
their reservation point—and the possibility of the opposing party walking away to 
avoid a perceived bad–faith negotiation.89  On the other side of the bargaining table, 
the opposing party cannot prevent the offeror from making an arbitrary initial 
proposition, but he or she can take steps to resist the number’s persuasive power.90  
The first and easiest way to defend against an anchor is to come to the negotiation 
with adequate preparation.91  Other methods of defense include counter–anchoring, 
rejecting the anchor, or ignoring the anchor altogether.92  Anchoring decisions, 
whether an initial offer or a countermeasure, require foresight and depend heavily 
on a negotiator’s knowledge of the zone of possible agreement and assessment of 
the other party’s knowledge of the same.93 
 
 82. Tara Ollapally & Annapurna Sreehari, Why do Negotiations Fail—The Cognitive Biases that 
Affect Human Interactions, YOURSTORY (Nov. 13, 2017), https://yourstory.com/2017/11/negotiations-
fail-cognitive-biases-affect-human-interactions. 
 83. Katie Shonk, What is Anchoring in Negotiation?, NEGOTIATION SKILLS DAILY (Feb. 19, 2019),   
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/what-is-anchoring-in-negotiation/. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Anchoring, WATERSHED ASSOCS., https://www.watershedassociates.com/learning-center-
item/anchoring.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. WATERSHED ASSOCS., supra note 86.  Counter–anchoring is responding to the other party’s anchor 
with an unreasonable offer in kind.  See PON Staff, Dealing with Difficult People: Coping with an 
Insulting Offer in Contract Negotiations, HARVARD LAW SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION (Apr. 27, 
2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dealing-with-difficult-people-daily/dealing-with-difficult-pe
ople-coping-with-an-insulting-offer/. 
 93. Shonk, supra note 83. 
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IV.  ANCHORING IN THE PATENT                                                              
PROSECUTION PROCESS 
Patent prosecution is a special type of negotiation, with rigidly regulated steps, 
that creates a unique context where anchoring can occur.94  While anchors can be 
laid in a few different stages of patent prosecution, they are most influential when 
drafting claims for a patent application’s specification.95  Before moving on to the 
reasons to avoid an anchoring strategy, it is important to recognize the benefits that 
can be brought about by successful use of an anchor in a patent application. 
A.  When Do Negotiators Drop Anchors? 
Returning briefly to the basics, negotiation and negotiation theory encompass 
a substantial range of activities broadly described as “deal[ing] with someone else, 
seeking to reach agreement on some matter.”96  The communication between two 
parties and the iterative process that follows within the patent prosecution procedure 
mirror traditional elements of negotiation theory.97  It is easy, then, to characterize 
patent prosecution as a form of negotiation, but doing so minimizes just how unique 
and different it is from the “typical” negotiation.  The relationship must strike a 
delicate balance between issuing only valid patents that an inventor has a right to 
claim and obtaining as much patent coverage possible, as efficiently as possible.98  
Due to the special interests that arise in patent prosecution, there are many 
negotiation strategies that simply do not apply in the patent negotiation context.  
One strategy that remains, however, is anchoring.99 
The patent prosecutor, or applicant, is always the one that must get the ball 
rolling towards patent protection for the specified invention through submission of 
an initial application.100  There are several elements necessary to complete the 
application.  In particular, unless it is a provisional application,101 the specification 
must contain one or more claims over the subject matter regarded as the 
invention.102  In patent law, a familiar mantra holds true: “the name of the game is 
the claim.”103  The claims of the patent are used to determine whether or not 
 
 94. Stephenson, supra note 3. 
 95. See supra text accompanying n.16 for the meaning of specification. 
 96. NELKEN, supra note 4. 
 97. Brunner, supra note 7, at 8. 
 98. See Brunner, supra note 7, at 11; Lemley, supra note 30; George F. Wheeler, Creative Claim 
Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies, Specification Preparation, and Prosecution Tactics, 
3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 38, 39 (2003). 
 99. Brunner, supra note 7, at 10. 
 100. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2015) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, 
by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the Director.”).  
 101. John Calvert, The Provisional Patent Application: What You Need to Know, INVENTORS EYE (Apr. 
2010) (“A provisional patent application (PPA) is a patent application that can be used by a patent 
applicant to secure a filing date while avoiding the costs associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
nonprovisional patent application.”). 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 103. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims: American Perspectives, 
21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499–501 (1990). 
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infringement of the patent has occurred, with the assistance of intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence for proper interpretation.104 
The ultimate goal of a patent prosecutor is to “[w]ork hard to get the broadest 
claims available and a desirable range of narrower claims to protect against 
invalidity attacks, rather than pulling your punches in hope of producing a claim 
that is literally narrow as printed in the patent but effectively broad in litigation.”105  
In other words, a patent prosecutor wants the broadest coverage possible to defend 
against potential infringers, but there are tradeoffs that come with overly broad 
claims, such as susceptibility to invalidity challenges.106  The goal of achieving 
maximum protection leads applicants to claim very broadly in the initial application 
to obtain the broadest allowable scope at the end of the process.107  In effect, 
applicants often start their patent prosecution by anchoring high.108 
B.  Advantages 
From the perspective of a rational and self–interested inventor who interacts 
with the USPTO through a patent prosecutor, the benefits of anchoring at the start 
may seem too good to pass up.  Patent claims are usually drafted in a way that 
pushes the boundaries and may not accurately reflect the scope of the real 
invention.109  That said, rarely will a patent prosecutor get away with claims that are 
much too broad; an overwhelming majority of applications are rejected upon first 
office action.110  The USPTO cannot police every patent application perfectly, 
however, which means that claims beyond the scope of the invention are bound to 
get through on occasion.111 
From a traditional negotiation standpoint, the inventor sits in a prime position 
to start the patent prosecution negotiation with an aggressive anchor.  Applicants 
can easily understand the zone of possible agreement in advance of negotiations, 
well before the examiner gets his or her hands on the application.112  Because 
infringement is based upon whether another’s product or use falls within the 
patent’s boundaries, as defined by its claims, it makes sense to try for the broadest 
scope possible.113  Anchoring seems like a foolproof way to obtain the desired 
result, but the field’s many intricacies—including the relationship between 
applicant and examiner—render anchoring a strategy to be avoided in the context 
of patent claims. 
 
 104. Intrinsic evidence, which is the patent itself and its prosecution history including the prior art cited 
therein, and extrinsic evidence, which is evidence outside official administrative records of the patent’s 
procurement, are both used in claim interpretation.  See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 636–37. 
 105. Wheeler, supra note 98. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Brunner, supra note 7, at 13. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Tun–Jen Chiang, Forcing Patent Claims, 113 MICH. L. REV. 513, 523 (2015). 
 110. Carley et al., supra note 23. 
 111. Chiang, supra note 109, at 522 (“To be sure, patentees cannot get away with claiming everything 
in the universe because the PTO will scrutinize the claims.  And yet it is fanciful to suppose that the PTO 
can police patentees perfectly and catch every subtle drafting trick.”). 
 112. Shonk, supra note 83. 
 113. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 841 (1990) (“In arguing the case, she will try to demonstrate that the accused infringer’s 
product falls within the boundaries of her invention, as defined in her patent claims, or that any 
differences between the infringer’s device and her invention are insignificant.”).  
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V.  REASONS TO AVOID THE ANCHOR 
When a patent prosecutor is drafting claims, there are a plethora of factors to 
weigh, circumstances to account for, and judgments to be made on behalf of the 
applicants they represent.  Unsurprisingly, there is no perfect claim drafting 
strategy.  In general, though, there are three essential reasons to avoid an anchoring 
strategy when constructing claims: the impact on the applicant–examiner 
relationship; risks and detriments that result from anchoring; and incentives offered 
to draft reasonable, un–anchored claims. 
A.  Applicant–Examiner Relationship 
The relationship between applicant and patent examiner depends on many 
factors and cannot be fully defined by any single feature.114  Nonetheless, the 
relationship can be broadly categorized into one of the two main negotiation 
structures, positional–based or interest–based.115  When an applicant starts by 
anchoring in their application, the subsequent interactions will likely become 
positional.116  Indeed, positional–based negotiations characteristically begin with 
high demands, then turn to a series of concession on both ends when neither is 
willing to entirely give up their strongly–held position.117  It follows that anchoring 
is, in a way, the act of starting positional negotiations.  The goals of positional–
based negotiation match the goals of the traditional patent applicant as well— 
maximizing the gains generated from the negotiation and obtaining a patent with as 
broad of claims as possible.118 
Over the past few decades, positional–based negotiation has been criticized 
heavily, yet it remains a negotiation form that many parties still believe in and 
successfully employ in standard negotiations.119  The positional–based model has 
clear deficiencies when it comes to patent negotiations because the exchange 
between a patent examiner and applicant is quite unlike any other.120  These 
deficiencies are drawn out through the risks of anchoring, especially loss of 
credibility, damage to the relationship of trust and respect, and inability to ascertain 
the opposing party’s least acceptable agreement.121  Anchoring damages 
relationships that could be strategic and incredibly helpful.  Examiners often show 
a strong willingness to work with helpful applicants toward granting the patent.122  
Conversely, when applicants practice anchoring in an attempt to get broad 
protection, an examiner can counter by rejecting claims through an office action 
citing to prior art that is not exactly identical to the invention at issue.123  In this 
 
 114. Lande, supra note 51, at 45. 
 115. Id. at 17. 
 116. Menkel–Meadow, supra note 62, at 835. 
 117. Id. at 767. 
 118. Murray, supra note 65; Brunner, supra note 7, at 13. 
 119. Hilbert, supra note 72, at 1083. 
 120. Id. at 1096. 
 121. Brunner, supra note 7, at 17. 
 122. Id. at 12–13. 
 123. Id. at 13 (“[B]road claims may allow the Examiner to cite prior art that is unrelated to the invention 
for which a patent is sought, because the broadly drafted claims can be read onto the unrelated prior 
art.”). 
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way, anchoring can cause protracted prosecution, increased fees, and even invalid 
patents.124 
Rather than beginning an exchange contrary to the goals of patent prosecution 
and the interests of both parties, an applicant should recognize the examiner as a 
partner and try to follow an interest–based negotiation method.  When the two 
parties are no longer focused on “winning” the patent prosecution, they can easily 
recognize a common objective between them: creating a valid patent.125  When 
beginning an interest–based negotiation, the “[a]pplicant should keep in mind that 
her presentation on the claims and the prior art is a prelude to a negotiation aimed 
at reaching agreement on what is patentable.”126  Giving as much detail possible in 
the specification and presenting prior art to guide the interpretation of the claims 
help the examiner give meaningful rejections when necessary and help applicants 
prove claims are sufficiently valid even when broad.127  The effectiveness of 
interest–based patent negotiation in comparison to positional–based negotiation 
should serve as a reminder that each side should work to bring the patent to fruition 
and attempt to reach an understanding. 
B.  Losses in Litigation 
It is the essence of the patent system that inventors who disclose their valid 
inventions receive a limited monopoly to exclude others from infringing upon their 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights.128  Patent holders are not obligated to keep others 
from infringing, but if they choose to exercise their right, litigation is their means 
of doing so.129  The best patents have valid claims with as broad of a scope as 
possible to protect against as many potential infringers in the claimed subject matter 
as possible.130  To assert their intellectual property rights, a patentee—an applicant 
granted a patent—must allege either literal infringement or “nontextual” 
infringement through the doctrine of equivalents.131 
The doctrine of equivalents, an entirely judicially made rule of law, is a very 
important aspect of patent litigation because it contributes substantially to the 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 16. 
 126. Stephen C. Durant et al., Fundamentals of Patent Prosecution 2008: A Boot Camp for Claim 
Drafting & Amendment Writing, 936 P.L.I.: PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 249, 259 (June 2008). 
 127. Brunner, supra note 7, at 11. 
 128. MUELLER, supra note 5. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Brunner, supra note 7, at 11. 
 131. See MUELLER, supra note 5, at 662–63; Melody Musoni, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent 
Claim Interpretation, MOORE IP: MOORE INTELLECTUAL PROP. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.moorepaten
t.co.za/the-doctrine-of-equivalents-in-patent-claim-interpretation/ (“Non–textual infringement . . . occurs 
when third parties attempt to design around a patent whilst making use of the basic idea of the patentee 
and varying, adding or omitting from the patentee’s invention to benefit therefrom without suffering the 
consequences of infringement.”); Doctrine of Equivalents, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law
.cornell.edu/wex/doctrine_of_equivalents (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) (Doctrine of Equivalents is “[a] 
means by which a patentee may raise a claim of infringement even though each and every element of 
the patented invention is not identically present in the allegedly infringing product.  The purpose of the 
doctrine is to prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of a patented invention by changing only 
minor or insubstantial details of the claimed invention while retaining the same functionality.  The 
essential inquiry in determining equivalency is whether the accused product or process contains elements 
identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.”). 
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standard for determining patent infringement liability.132  The doctrine comes into 
effect when there are accused devices that differ from the claims in inconsequential 
amounts but are not fully encompassed within the literal scope of the claim.133  
Naturally, an anchor strategy would seem to achieve the broadest claims for 
litigation purposes, but such an assumption is misleading.  Anchoring claims within 
a patent application is a dangerous strategy.134  Anchoring has a potentially 
immense impact on the patent holder’s future rights through litigation in both the 
defense of prosecution history estoppel and through invalidity.135 
1.  Prosecution History Estoppel 
The risk a patent prosecutor assumes when he or she aggressively anchors the 
claims of an application is that too-broad claims will be swiftly rejected.136  While 
this may not seem like the worst fate, as the process explicitly allows for 
amendments in this situation, having to narrow the scope of a claim can come back 
to haunt the patentee through prosecution history estoppel.137  Prosecution history 
estoppel is “the principle that statements used in communications between a patent 
attorney and a patent Examiner at the USPTO can and will be used against an 
applicant if a patent is litigated.”138  In short, when an applicant narrows a claim 
due to rejection of the subject matter claimed initially, the subject matter “between” 
that initial claim and the reduced claim, as determined by the intrinsic evidence, 
cannot be asserted to be included within the doctrine of equivalents.139  Despite 
differences in interpretation across inferior courts, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the Festo140 line of cases, determined that an examination of subject matter 
surrendered by narrowing amendments is required and established a rebuttable 
presumption that such amendments surrender the particular equivalent.141 
Any patent attorney would dread having to overcome the presumption that an 
amendment to a particular claim surrenders the subject matter of the limitation 
 
 132. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 136. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Yelderman, infra note 155, at 1982. 
 135. See discussion infra Sections V(B)(1)–(2). 
 136. Carley et al., supra note 23. 
 137. Brunner, supra note 7, at 8. 
 138. Gene Pierson, What is Prosecution History Estoppel?, PIERSON INTELLECTUAL PROP. (Sept. 11, 
2013), http://piersonpatentlaw.com/what-is-prosecution-history-estoppel/. 
 139. MUELLER, supra note 5, at 674.  Suppose an applicant claimed 1 through 10, but the examiner 
rejected this because 9 has already been claimed, so the applicant then reduces their claims to 1 through 
8.  The “area” between 8 and 10 has been given up and cannot be asserted in an infringement case later 
should the patent be granted.  If the applicant originally claimed 1 through 8, it could be argued that 8.4 
is within the same meaning as 8 under the doctrine of equivalents, but this is barred for the applicant 
who reduced the claim after rejection due to prosecution history estoppel. 
 140. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002).  Festo 
Corporation sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“SMC”), alleging that SMC infringed two 
of its patents through literal infringement and nontextual infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  
The jury found no literal infringement, but instead held SMC liable for infringement through the doctrine 
of equivalents.  The question before the Supreme Court was whether an estoppel applied to a voluntary 
amendment to preclude the doctrine of equivalents, and it was held that when an inventor narrows the 
claims of an application by amendment, and the amendment is not made to make the claim patentable, 
the doctrine of equivalents is still available against infringers.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 738 (“There is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to relinquish 
equivalents, beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered.”). 
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/14
No. 2] Reasons to Avoid the Anchor: Negotiation in Patent Prosecution 481 
under the doctrine of equivalents.  The best way of evading prosecution history 
estoppel altogether is to draft claims balanced enough to avoid rejections requiring 
amendment, while also attempting to cast as wide of an anti–infringement safety 
net as possible.142  Such a feat, however, would require unattainable foresight into 
not only every element of the subject matter, but also the subjective thoughts of the 
assigned examiner, as one examiner can operate very differently from the next.143  
Following an initial office action, a patent prosecutor will almost always be forced 
to amend the claims for narrower breadth, starting the fire that lights the way for a 
defendant in future litigation to invoke prosecution history estoppel.144 
2.  Defense of Invalidity 
When the patentee brings a claim against an alleged infringer, either for direct 
infringement or “nontextual” infringement, the invalidity of the issued patent can 
be raised as a defense and cause trouble in instances of successfully anchored 
claims.  To the benefit of the patentee, there is a presumption of validity of the 
patent and each claim therein that the defendant must overcome.145  To meet his or 
her burden, the defendant may prove invalidity of the patent on the same grounds 
that could have prohibited patentability with the USPTO, including compliance 
with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (patent–eligible subject matter and utility); 102 (novelty); 
103 (nonobviousness); and 112 (specification requirements).146  While the USPTO 
can try to perfectly reject, narrow, and finally accept every single patent application, 
some claims that are functionally too broad to be valid will inevitably slip 
through.147  The defense of invalidity offers the defendant a chance to identify and 
challenge the imperfections of the USPTO, albeit with a higher burden.148  
Invalidity can effectively be used to police bold patent claimants who try to claim 
as much as possible without providing an accurate reflection of their invention.149 
Further, upon declaration by a federal court that a patent is invalid, the patent 
owner is collaterally estopped from asserting validity of the patent against other 
alleged infringers.150  This doctrine precludes relitigating issues, such as claim 
construction, rather than entire legal claims, such as patent infringement.151  In 
 
 142. Robert Buergi, Myths About Avoiding Prosecution History Estoppel, LAW JOURNAL 
NEWSLETTERS (Jan. 2005), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2005/01
/28/myths-about-avoiding-prosecution-history-estoppel/?slreturn=20200220162513. 
 143. Jeff O’Neill, Winning Strategies for Getting Past the Five Types of Patent Examiner, IP 
WATCHDOG (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/31/winning-strategies-patent-
examiner/id=105762/. 
 144. Carley et al., supra note 23, at 204. 
 145. JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 813 (5th ed. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“Each claim of a 
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple 
dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.  The burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 146. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012).  For definitions of these requirements, see supra Section II. 
 147. Chiang, supra note 109, at 514 (“To be sure, patentees cannot get away with claiming everything 
in the universe because the PTO will scrutinize the claims.  And yet it is fanciful to suppose that the PTO 
can police patentees perfectly and catch every subtle drafting trick.”). 
 148. Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 103 (2013). 
 149. Id. at 123. 
 150. See Blonder–Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
 151. Terril G. Lewis, Collateral Estoppel as Applied to the Construction of Patent Claims (Part I), 83 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 851, 856 (2001). 
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general, courts apply a four–part test to identify issues that are estopped.152  In 
comparison to other forms of litigation, patent litigation is special because it “has 
the potential to scuttle monopolies and open markets,” elevating issue preclusion 
through collateral estoppel.153  While a patent holder can re–examine his or her 
claims,154 or include a desirable range of narrower claims as insurance against 
invalidity,155 the risk of an issued patent with purposely broad claims remains.  
There is an uncertainty that exists with inventions that are patented with broad 
claims as to the extent of the coverage that can be sustained.  This in turn leaves 
room for sizable investments into a field that is later realized as being unprotected, 
which puts a substantial risk on the patent holder and investors in these broadly 
claimed inventions. 
C.  Rewards for Steering Clear 
In addition to the numerous disincentives for those aggressively pursuing 
overbroad patent coverage, the USPTO has implemented certain initiatives to push 
applicants to avoid the anchor.  Programs such as Track One, also known as 
Prioritized Examination,156 and Accelerated Examination offer such incentives.157  
These programs aim to address the fact that time can work against many inventors, 
especially independent inventors or small business owners.158  Patented technology 
makes for a more preferable investment, and without financial support from outside 
investors, businesses can stall.159  Thus, speed of patent prosecution is a major factor 
in an inventor’s intellectual property decision process, and the following programs 
offer expediency as a reward to inventors who avoid anchors.160 
1.  Accelerated Examination 
In August of 2006, the USPTO established the Accelerated Examination 
procedure as a way for applicants to jump ahead in the metaphorical patent 
prosecution line.161  The goal of Accelerated Examination is to reach final 
 
 152. See Charles Bieneman, How Is Collateral Estoppel Applied to Patent Invalidity?, THE SOFTWARE 
IP REPORT (May 14, 2018), https://www.b2ipreport.com/swip-report/collateral-estoppel-applied-patent-
invalidity/ (the court considers: “(1) whether there is substantial overlap between the evidence or 
argument presented in the prior case and the current one, (2) whether the current case involves the 
application of the same rule of law as the prior case, (3) whether pretrial preparation and discovery in 
the prior case would reasonably have been expected to uncover evidence or arguments raised in the 
current case, and (4) whether there is substantial overlap between the claims of the prior case and the 
current case.”). 
 153. Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 1946 
(2016). 
 154. Id. at 1943. 
 155. Wheeler, supra note 98, at 38. 
 156. See USPTO’s Prioritized Patent Examination, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/usptos-prioritized-patent-examination-program (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). 
 157. See Accelerated Examination, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/pat
ent/initiatives/accelerated-examination (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
 158. Track One Prioritized Examination Puts Your Innovation in the Fast Lane, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Nov. 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-
eye/track-one-prioritized-examination-puts-your. 
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 160. Id. 
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disposition within twelve months.162  The filing must have three or fewer 
independent claims and the sum of independent and dependent claims must be no 
more than twenty claims total.163  An interview with the examiner occurs before the 
first office action, and the petition fee is $140.164  Accelerated Examination differs 
from normal patent prosecution in that it must be filed with pre–examination 
documents and an examination support document.165  In other words, the applicant, 
when filing for the procedure, must have done his or her own examination of prior 
art and provided explanations as to how the claims differ from the identified prior 
art.166 
The most obvious advantage of using Accelerated Examination is its rightful 
description as “accelerated”; the faster a patent application is completed, the 
better,167 and the sooner the patent is obtained, the greater the number years 
remaining on the patent duration following prosecution.168  Because this process 
requires that applicants conduct a thorough pre–examination search, characterize 
which limitations are taught by the prior art, and provide an explanation of 
patentability, much of the examiner’s work has already been completed by the time 
the application reaches an examiner.169  In essence, the accelerated process is a form 
of anti–anchoring where the goal is to help the other party glean a clear 
understanding of the proposal and how it compares to the rest of the field.  By 
accurately representing claims from the beginning, an applicant can potentially 
obtain his or her patent with fewer office actions, less complex of responses, and 
less attorney time devoted to office action analyses.170 
2.  Track One 
The Track One program was instituted in 2011 as part of the America Invents 
Act, and is known officially as the Prioritized Patent Examination Program.171  Like 
Accelerated Examination, Track One promises a final disposition within twelve 
months.172  Track One comes after and takes from other similarly established 
 
 162. Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated 
Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36.323 (proposed June 26, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 163. Id. at 36.324. 
 164. See id.; Michael Henry, How to Speed Up Patent Prosecution at the USPTO, HENRY PATENT LAW 
FIRM (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.henrypatentfirm.com/blog/speed-up-patent-prosecution. 
 165. Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated 
Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36.324–25. 
 166. Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, USPTO Considering an End to Accelerated Examination, IP 
WATCHDOG (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/30/uspto-end-accelerated-
examination/id=72377/; Henry, supra note 164. 
 167. Hilberg, Hirning, & Kiedrowski, supra note 44. 
 168. Id. at 53. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. James Cosgrove & Katrina Brundage, Don’t Wait to File a Track One Request if You Think You 
Might Need It, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/10/31/dont-wait-to-
file-a-track-one-request/id=74189/; VEDDER PRICE, Summary of the America Invents Act, NAT’L LAW 
REVIEW (Apr. 12, 2012), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/summary-america-invents-act (“On 
September 16, 2011, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA), also called the Patent Reform Act of 
2011, was enacted into law.  President Obama stated that this ‘long overdue reform is vital to our ongoing 
efforts to modernize America’s patent laws.’  The changes mostly harmonize U.S. patent law with the 
rest of the world.”). 
 172. Cosgrove & Brundage, supra note 171. 
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programs such as the aforementioned Accelerated Examination, as well as Patent 
Prosecution Highway,173 Green Pilot Program,174 and provisions for special 
examination due to the applicant’s age or health.175  As of May 4, 2017, Track One 
applications received, on average,  first office actions two months from the grant of 
the prioritized status and final dispositions six–and–a–half months thereafter.176  In 
comparison, regular applications averaged sixteen months for the first office action 
and twenty–six months or longer for final disposition.177 
A big factor that weighs against choosing Track One is the cost; the non–small 
entity patent application Track One fee is $4,000.178  Original applications further 
require a filing fee, search fee, examination fee, application size fee, and excess 
claims fees.179  In order to be eligible, an application cannot have more than four 
independent claims, more than thirty dependent claims, or multiple dependent 
claims.180  On top of the numerous fees, Track One is terminated if: the applicant 
requests an extension of time; a “final” office action is mailed by the USPTO; the 
applicant requests continued examination or suspension of action; the applicant files 
a notice of appeal; or the application is amended to contain more than four 
independent claims, more than thirty total claims, or a multiple dependent claim.181 
Many members of the IP community view Track One as a much more favorable 
route to receiving a patent quickly than Accelerated Examination because of its 
more lenient requirements.182  As Gene Quinn183 puts it, “[i]n a world where 
lightning fast, prioritized examination can be had for the payment of a fee it really 
doesn’t make sense to go through the trouble of doing the rigorous search and 
creating an examination support document that will create nothing but an 
undesirably negative prosecution history.”184  Track One has many of the same 
benefits for applicants in enhancing business objectives, including IP and 
commercialization strategies, enforcement activities, capital attracting, and 
 
 173. Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH)—Fast Track Examination of Applications, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/patent-
prosecution-highway-pph-fast-track (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).  The Patent Prosecution Highway speeds 
up the examination process for intellectual property offices falling under the International Protection 
category. 
 174. See Green Technology Pilot Program—Closed, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://ww
w.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/green-technology-pilot-program-closed (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).  The 
Green Technology Pilot Program allowed applications to be advanced out of turn for examination when 
they pertained to green technologies such as environmental quality, energy conservation, development 
of renewable energy resources, etc. 
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Patent Examination Programs in the United States and Abroad, 3 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BR. 30 (2012). 
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LAW REVIEW (May 4, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/track-one-still-one-accelerating-pa
tent-examination-us. 
 177. Id. 
 178. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(c) (2016). 
 179. Brandes, supra note 176. 
 180. Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the Enhanced Examination 
Timing Control Procedures Under the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 59.050, 59.051 
(proposed Sept. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 181. Brandes, supra note 176. 
 182. Quinn & Brachmann, supra note 166. 
 183. See Gene Quinn—Biography, IP WATCHDOG, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/people/gene-quinn-
3/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
 184. Quinn & Brachmann, supra note 166. 
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reducing perceived risk by investors or licensees.185  For applications in which a 
request was filed simultaneously with the patent application, the benefits are 
manifold—higher allowance rates, faster prosecutions, and fewer office actions.186  
Although not as anti–anchor as Accelerated Examination, there is still a general 
deterrence of anchoring in Track One in part because of the claim limits, the short 
length of prosecution without extension, and the up–front financial investment into 
the process.187 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Patent prosecution is built upon the relationship between the applicant and the 
examiner.  Just as any other negotiation, this relationship can work smoothly and 
cooperatively through an interest–based method where the two parties strive 
together to advance each other’s goals.  Contrarily, one party can attempt to gain an 
upper hand or leverage their way into success through a positional–based 
negotiation method where the process is adversarial.  The choice of which of these 
processes to employ rests upon how an applicant launches his or her patent 
prosecution.  Will the applicant aggressively claim as much protection as he or she 
can, or will the applicant narrow their scope and make the process easier on 
everyone involved?  This is the choice that must be made when deciding whether 
to anchor the claims in a patent application.  The reasons to avoid doing so are clear.  
Whether it be the incentives introduced by the USPTO, the potential detriments and 
risks that anchoring poses, the importance of preserving the relationship between 
applicant and examiner, or some combination thereof, there are certainly reasons to 


















 185. Carey Jordan, Strategic Uses of New USPTO Initiatives & Procedures: How to Improve 
Prosecution Expediency, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014 
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 187. Brandes, supra note 176 (“Therefore, Track One may not be advisable if an applicant does not 
expect to be able to keep up with the rapid pace of examination.  Track One may also not be advisable 
for applications that require lengthy claim sets to capture all the important aspects of an invention.”). 
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